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Recent Decision

INDIAN

CHILD

WELFARE

ACT-ADOPTIONS-DOMICILE

DE-

FINED-The United States Supreme Court has held that in child

custody cases involving Indian children whose parents are domiciled on the reservation, the tribal court will have exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings pursuant to section 1911(a) of the
ICWA, despite the fact that the children were born off the reservation, voluntarily given up for adoption by both parents, and under
state law the children's domicile was that of their adopted parents
giving the state courts jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).

__

U.S.

-,

Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)1
in response to the alarmingly high percentage of Indian children
that were being removed, often unwarranted, from their families
by nontribal public and private agencies.2 Statistics presented during the 1974 Congressional hearings concerning problems that
American Indian families face in raising their children showed that
25 to 35 percent of all Indian children had been separated from
their families and tribes.' Often, these children were removed by
social workers who felt that the children were neglected or abandoned by their parents." Approximately 90 percent of these Indian
placements were in non-Indian homes. This often resulted in seri1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
2. Id. at § 1901(4) (1978).
3. Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1974)(hereinafter 1974 Hearings). See also Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.
S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 9 of the House Report
No. 95-1386).
4. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7532 (citing page 10 of the House Report No. 95-1386).
5. 1974 Hearings supra note 3, at 75-83.
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ous adjustment problems for the children.'
In 1977 and 1978, additional hearings were held on the bill that
would become the ICWA. 7 These hearings in part emphasized the
destructive impact that occurred on the tribe itself when Indian
children were removed from the tribe to be placed in non-Indian
homes and institutions.' It was concluded that the removal of Indian children seriously undercut a tribe's ability to continue as a
self-governing community.9 Furthermore, the failure of non-Indian
welfare workers to appreciate the extended family concept in the
Indian culture resulted in the unnecessary removal of many Indian
children."'
The ICWA incorporates these sentiments by stating that it
"seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and
the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society."11 Basic to the ICWA are its provisions concerning jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings by es6. See generally 1974 Hearings supra note 3. Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, a University
of Minnesota social psychiatrist, testified that while the Indian children were raised in a
white culture and given a white identity, when they reached adolescence society would not
grant them a white identity. For example, parents of white children did not want their children dating Indian children and the Indian children found that ". . . society was putting on
them an identity which they didn't possess and taking from them an identity that they did
possess." Id. at 46.
7. Hearing on S. 1214 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (hereinafter 1977 Hearings.); Hearings on S. 1214 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (hereinafter 1978 Hearings).
8. Id. Mr Calvin Issac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and
representative of the National Tribal Chairman Association, testified that Indian children
are the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage and, as such, the chances
of Indian survival are significantly reduced when the children are denied exposure to the
Indian culture by being raised in non-Indian homes. 1978 Hearings at 193.
9. Id.
10. Act of Nov. 8,1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 10 of House Report No. 95-1386). Many social workers
terminated parental rights when the children were left with persons outside of the nuclear
family because they considered that situation as evidence of neglect. Id. See also, 1974
Hearings at 473, Senator Abourezk speaking ". . . there is no such thing as an abandoned
child because when a child does have a need for parents for one reason or another, a relative
or a friend will take that child in. It's the extended family concept." Id.
11. Act of Nov. 8,1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531. (citing to page 23 of House Report No. 95-1386). In its findings,
Congress concluded that Indian children are vital to the existence and integrity of the Indian Tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1978). The findings also concluded that in an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families the children are removed and placed in non-Indian foster
and adoptive homes. Id. at § 1901(4). Also, the states in exercising jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings often fail to recognize the essential tribal relations of the Indian culture. Id. at § 1901(5).
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tablishing a dual jurisdictional scheme. 2 First, it provides for
exclusive tribal jurisdiction when an Indian child resides or is domiciled within the reservation, or when the child is a ward of the
tribal court."3 Second, when an Indian child is not domiciled on the
reservation or a ward of a tribal court, the ICWA creates not only
concurrent, but presumptive, jurisdiction with a tribal court rather
than a state court." Absent good cause to the contrary, preference
shall be given in adoptive placements to: (1) a member of the
child's extended family, (2) other members of the same tribe, or (3)
with other Indian families.' 5
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,6 twin illegitimate Indian children (known as B.B. and G.B.) were born on
December 29, 1985, in Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi,
some 200 miles from the Choctaw Reservation in Neshoba County
where both parents were domiciled and enrolled as members of the
Mississippi Band of the Choctaw Indian Tribe. 17 Twelve days later,
their mother, J.B., executed a consent to adoption form before the
Chancery Court of Harrison County.' 8 The father, W.J., signed a
similar form.' 9 On January 16, 1986 the appellees, Orey and Vivian
Holyfield, filed a petition for adoption in the same court, and, despite the court's apparent awareness of the ICWA,2 0 the final de12.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a) provides in part: "An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested
in the State by existing Federal Law." Id.
14. Id. at § 1911 (b). 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) provides that: " in the absence of good cause
to the contrary, [a state court] shall transfer [child custody] proceedings to the jurisdiction
of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the
Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe." Id.
15. Id. at § 1915 (a).
16. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
17. Id. at 1602.
18. Id. Section 1913 (a) of the ICWA mandates that in any voluntary consent to termination of parental rights, the consent must be executed in writing and recorded before a
judge in a court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, any consent that is given prior to
birth, or within 10 days after birth is invalid. 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (a)(1978). In this case, J.B.'s
consent was given 12 days after the birth of B.B. and G.B. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at
1602 n.7.
19. 109 S. Ct. at 1602. W.J. had signed a consent to adoption on January 11, 1986.
However, it was not until June 3, 1986-well after the decree of adoption had been entered
and the Tribe had filed suit to vacate the decree-the chancellor of the chancery court
certified that the father had appeared before him to execute the consent to adoption. Id. at
n. 8.
20. Id. at 1603. The court apparently was aware of the ICWA because the certificate of
the chancellor showing that the parents had appeared before him and consented to the
adoption stated that "the Consent and Waiver was given in full compliance with Section 103
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cree of adoption that was issued on January 28 contained no reference to the ICWA nor to the children's Indian background.2
Two months later the Tribe moved the chancery court to vacate
the adoption decree, arguing that the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the ICWA applied to give the tribal court jurisdiction over
the twins.2 2 This motion was overruled in a one-page opinion in
which the court held that the Tribe "never obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the children."2 3
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.2 4 The Mississippi
Supreme Court realized that whether or not the tribal court had
jurisdiction was dependent on whether the twins were born domiciled on the Choctaw Reservation.2 5 The Supreme Court of Mississippi determined that "at no point in time were the twins domiciled within the Territory set aside for the reservation. 2 6 The
court held that because the twins' place of domicile was in Harrison County, and not on the reservation, the ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction did not apply and the state court had properly exercised
jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings.2 7
The United States Supreme Court granted plenary review 28 due
to the objective of the exclusive tribal jurisdiction provision as it
related to the overall purpose of the ICWA, as well as to address
(a) of Public Law 95-608 - (i.e., 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (a))." Id. at n. 11.
21. Id. at 1603.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court's reasoning was that the mother made an effort to give birth to the
twins off the reservation, and that both parents had moved quickly in arranging for the
adoption by the Holyfields. Id.
24. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d 918 (1987).
25. Id. at 921.
26. Id. at 921. The Tribe had cited two Mississippi cases which recognized the principle that the domicile of minor children follows that of their parents. See Boyle v. Griffin, 84
Miss. 41, 36 So. 141 (1940); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 211 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1968). The Supreme
Court of Mississippi distinguished these cases from Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield due to the fact that in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians the natural parents
went to some lengths to have the twins born off the reservation and to voluntarily surrender
and legally abandon their children. Choctaw Indians, 511 So. 2d at 921.
27. Id.
28. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1604. It was unclear as to whether this case fell
within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction where there is a question as to "the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1988). The Court decided that
whether the Tribe's argument that state court jurisdiction over the adoptions was preempted by federal legislation "squarely" challenged the validity of the state adoption statute as applied would be a difficult question to answer. Rather than to attempt to answer the
question the Court dismissed the appeal, then treated the papers as a petition for writ of
certiorari, and then granted the petition. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1604 n.15.
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the conflicting decisions concerning the definition of domicile that
had developed between the states when applying the ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction provision. 9 The sole issue to be decided was
whether the twins were "domiciled" on the reservationY'.
After pointing out that the ICWA does not in itself define domicile, Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority, stated that the
initial question to be confronted was whether the United States
Congress intended the ICWA definition of domicile to be a matter
of state law.3 1 The Court began their analysis with the general assumption that unless there is a plain indication to the contrary,
federal statutes are not dependent upon state law.32 The Court
gave two reasons for this general rule. First, Federal statutes are
generally intended to have uniform nationwide application; 33 and
second, if state law was to control, federal programs would often be
impaired.3 4 Thus, the Court will consider the congressional purpose
in enacting the statute in order to determine the intent of
Congress. 5
To determine whether Congress intended to apply a state or a
federal definition of domicile the Court looked to the purpose of
the ICWA. 8 The Court used, as a guideline, the same approach it
37
used in NLRB v Hearst Publications.
In that case, the Court
29. Id. at 1604. See e.g., In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986); In re
Adoption of Baby Child, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985); In re Appeal in Pima

County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied
sub num. Catholic Social Services of Tucson v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
30. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1605. This was also the sole issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court. Id.
31. Id. at 1605. Justice White, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia joined Brennan in the majority. Stevens, J., filed the dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 1611.
32. Id. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943): NLRB v. Natural Gas
Utility Dist. 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute Inc., 460 U.S. 103,

119 (1983).
33. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1605-06. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101,
104 (1943); NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971); Dickerson v. New
Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103,119, (1983). Compare with, Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946) (when Congress does not intend uniformity the court will apply the state-law definition of the statutory term. In Beaver County
the statute permitted the States to use their diverse local tax laws to real property of specific government corporations).
34. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1606.
35. Id. at 1610. See also, United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403, (1941).
36. 109 S. Ct. at 1610.
37. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The term employee as used in the Wagner Act was to be
defined by federal law rather than state standards because the Act was intended to solve a
national problem, and nothing in that statutes history indicated its scope was to be limited
by varying local conceptions. Id. at 123-24.
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looked first to the Congressional purpose, and then to the history
of the statute, to determine whether to apply federal standards or
state standards when construing an undefined term. 8 Applying
this approach in the present case, the Supreme Court first determined that the purpose of the ICWA was to resolve the crises that
threatened the future of Indian tribes and families due, in part, to
the failure of state officials and agencies to recognize the rights of
Indian tribes and families in preserving and protecting their own
future through their children.3 9 The majority determined that because of this expressed concern over the rights of Indian families
and communities, Congress could not have intended that the critical jurisdictional term "domicile" be subject to definition by state
courts. 0 Second, the Court noted that "Congress could hardly have
intended the lack of nationwide uniformity that would result from
state-law definitions of domicile."4 1 The Court concluded that Congress unequivocally desired Federal law to control the definition of
"domicile" for the purposes of the ICWA. 2
The next step in the Court's analysis was to give content to the
term "domicile" when the children involved had never physically
been on the reservation, and when they were voluntarily surrendered by their parents. 43 The Court stated that when a statutory
term is not defined, the assumption is that the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.44 The majority also noted that even though they were dealing
38. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1606.
39. Id. See Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531. (citing page 19 of the House Report No. 95-1386). State
officials, agencies, and procedures have failed "to take into account the ... legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in preserving and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring of its
own future." Id. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1978). States... "have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families." Id.
40. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1606-07.
41. Id. at 1607. For example, if a state definition of domicile were used an Indian
parent domiciled on a reservation in New Mexico could simply transport her children to a
Mississippi state court for adoption to avoid the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the
ICWA. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had determined that the twins were not
domiciled on the reservation for a number of reasons. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,
511 So.2d at 921. First, because they were never physically present on the reservation. Id.
Next, because the parents went to some lengths to have the children born off the reservation. Id. Finally, because the parents had voluntarily surrendered and legally abandoned the
twins to the Holyfields. Id.
44. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1607. See, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9
(1962); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983). The Court will look to the ordinary
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with a uniform federal definition of domicile rather than a state
definition, they were not prevented from using any well-settled
state law that was consistent with the objectives of the ICWA
when determining the meaning of the word "domicile."'" In normal
parlance, the Supreme Court noted that a minor's domicile is usually determined by the domicile of the parents due to the fact that
most minors are incapable of forming the legal intent to establish a
domicile of their own.46 Thus, it is possible that a child's domicile
7
will be a place where the child has never been physically present.'
As a result, the domicile of an illegitimate child has traditionally
been the domicile of its mother. 8
In this case, the Supreme Court noted that the domicile of both
the mother and the father was on the Choctaw Reservation.49 So

while the Supreme Court of Mississippi's statement that "at no
point in time can it be said that the twins . . . were domiciled
within the territory set aside for the reservation,'" may be an ac-

curate statement of Mississippi's law of domicile, it is contradictory to the generally accepted federal domicile doctrine, and could
not be what Congress had in mind when it used the term in the
ICWA.5'
The Court pointed out that the fact that the children were voluntarily surrendered by their parents made no difference, since in
addition to protecting the interests of Indian children and their
families, a further objective of the ICWA included concern over
the harmful impact to the tribes themselves when large numbers of
Indian children were adopted by non-Indians.2 A state law of
domicile that would allow Indian parents to change the domicile of
their child merely because it was born off the reservation and voluntarily "abandoned" would defeat the ICWA's jurisdictional
meaning of the words in the context of the "object and policy" of the statute. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285, (1956), quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8
How. 113, 122 (1849).
45. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
46. Id. See Yarborough v. Yarbcrough, 290 U.S. 202, 211, (1983).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14, comment b (1971).
48. Id. See Kowalski v WojtKowski, 19 N.J. 247, 258, 116 A. 2d 6, 12 (1955); In re
Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d 792, 796, 415 P. 2d 653, 656 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14, comment b (1971); Am. Jur. 2d Domicile § 69 (1966).
49. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
50. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 511 So. 2d at 921.
51. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1608.
52. Id. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1978), "there is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children." Id. at 1608-09.
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scheme, and would be inconsistent with what Congress intended. 3
Such a law of abandonment that permits a mother to change her
child's domicile in order to facilitate the child's adoption by nonIndians weakens the tribe's efforts to assert its interest in its children. 5 The exclusive jurisdiction provision of the ICWA is meant
to protect the relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation.5 5 Therefore, a state law of abandonment cannot be used to defeat the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions involving Indian children who are domiciled on the
reservation.5
The fact that it was the mother's desire to give birth to the twins
off the reservation so that they could be adopted outside of the
tribe, and that she went to great lengths to accomplish this, also
cannot be used to defeat the purpose of the ICWA 7 While the
majority conceded that a separation of the twins from their
adopted parents of three years would cause considerable pain, that
did not change the fact that the Chancery Court of Harrison
County was without jurisdiction." Therefore, the decree of adoption was vacated, and the judgement of the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed.59 The Court held that the twins were domiciled
on the reservation and that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the appropriate remedy concerning the custody
of the children.60 The case was remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion. 1
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion.2 The dissent
agreed with the majority view that Congress intended a uniform
federal law of domicile for the ICWA.6 However, the dissent
53. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1609.
54. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986).
55. Id. at 969-70.
56. Id. at 970.
57. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1610. The Court quoted the "scholarly" and "sensitive" opinion of In re Adoption of Halloway which stated:
To the extent that [state] abandonment law operates to permit [the child's] mother
to change [the child's] domicile . . . it cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgement expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial
decisions made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect as the interests of the parents.
In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P. 2d 962, 969-70 (1986).
58. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1611.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined in the dissent. Id.
63. Id.
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stated that when the majority precluded parents domiciled on a
reservation from deliberately using the adoption procedures of a
state court the majority distorted the sensitive balance between individual rights and group rights recognized by the ICWA. 4 According to the dissent, this gave the term "domicile" a meaning
that Congress could not have intended.6 5 The dissent pointed out
that the Act was primarily concerned with the unjustified removal
of Indian children from their families by nontribal agencies which
did not fully consider Indian cultural and social standards and relations."6 In addition, Justice Stevens pointed to the many sections
of the ICWA that established safeguards to insure that parental
rights were protected. 7 Justice Stevens believed that the rights
that the Act gave specifically to the tribe were meant to complement, not restrict, the rights of the parents. 8 Furthermore, the apparent intent of Congress in incorporating the exclusive jurisdiction provision in the ICWA was to protect the tribe's sovereign
interests over the familial relationship of tribe members.6 9 How64. Id. at 1612.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added). See 25 U.S.C. §1901 (4),(5) (1978) "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and . . . placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions." Id. See also, Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 9 of
the House Report No. 95-1386); S. Rep. No. 95-597, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977).; 124
Cong. Rec. 12532 (1978), (remarks of Rep. Udall) "The record developed ... has disclosed
what almost amounts to a callous raid on Indian children. Indian children are removed from
their parents and families by State agencies for the most specious of reasons in proceedings
foreign to the Indian parents." Id.
67. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1612. A party who seeks to effect foster care placement, or involuntary termination of parental rights, must establish that efforts have been
made to prevent the breakup of the family and that the continued custody of the child by
the parent is likely to result in serious harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)-(f) (1978);
Each party to the proceeding has a right to examine all reports and documents that are filed
with the court, and indigent parents or custodians have the right to counsel. Id. at §1912(b)(c); when the termination is voluntary, consent is only valid after the terms and consequences of the consent have been fully explained, may be withdrawn at any time up to the
final entry of a decree of termination or adoption, and even then may be collaterally attacked on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. at §1913(a)-(c).
68. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1613. The Indian tribe may petition to transfer an
action in state court to the tribal court, but the Indian parent may veto the transfer. 25
U.S.C. §1911(b)(1978). The tribe has a right of notice and intervention in involuntary proceedings, but not in voluntary ones. Id. at §§1911(c), 1912(a); The tribe may petition the
court to set aside a parental termination action upon a showing that the provisions of the
ICWA that are designed to protect parents and Indian children have been violated. Id. at
§1914
69. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1613. To support their statement the dissent cited
In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P. 2d 179 (1972), in which the state placed an Indian child
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ever, the dissent stated that the ICWA was not enacted to unseat
states of their historical jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings where the child fell within the state's geographical
boundaries.7"
As to the place of the children's domicile, the dissent regarded
the Mississippi law of abandonment, as expounded by the Mississippi Supreme Court in the present case, to serve the purpose of
the ICWA rather than frustrate the Act. 7 According to Mississippi
law, a child is abandoned when the parent deserts the child and
leaves him/her with another intending to surrender all parental
rights and obligations. 7 2 When the child is abandoned by both parents, he takes on the domicile of the person who stands in loco
parentis to him. 73 The dissent noted that the ICWA's substantive
and procedural provisions were concerned with the adequate protection of the interests of the Indian parents, their children, and
the tribe resulting from the unwarranted removal of the Indian
children from their families and tribe. 74 However, if both parents
deliberately abandoned their child outside the territory of the reservation in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the state court when
a non-Indian is involved, no interest in tribal self governance is
implicated. 75 Furthermore, the dissent stated that actions commenced long after adoption were disruptive to Indian stability and
76
security.
In its conclusion, the dissent reiterated that the majority's deciin a foster home only three days after the child left the Reservation to accompany his father
on a trip. Id. See also Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIz. L.
REV. 1123, 1129 (1979).
70. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 19 of the House Report No. 95-1386).
71. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1615.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 comment e (1971) In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986).
73. See In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P. 2d 962, 966 (1986); In re Estate of Moore,
68 Wash. 2d 792, 796, 415 P. 2d 653, 656 (1966); Harlan v Industrial Accident Comm'n., 194
Cal. 352, 228 P. 654 (1924); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, comment (i)
(1971); Cf. In re Guardianship of D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W. 2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980).
However, The majority opinion suggested that there could be no legally effective abandonment because the parents consented to termination of their parental rights before the state
which did not have jurisdiction over this child custody proceeding. Choctaw Indians, 109 S.
Ct. at 1610 n.26.
74. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1616. (emphasis added).
75. Id. See McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); Williams v Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959); Felix v Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892).
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978). "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this
Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families . . ." Id.
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sion was contrary to the purposes of the ICWA in holding that
adoption proceedings in a state court will be void for lack of jurisdiction when voluntarily attempted by parents who are domiciled
on the reservation." The majority's decision will most certainly
permit the grief suffered by the families in this case to continue in
the future.7
The majority and the dissent both agreed that Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile for the ICWA.79 Since the
ICWA does not itself define "domicile", the majority and the dissent agreed that to discern the meaning of the term within the Act
one must look to the purpose of the statute, and to judicial precedent that the legislature may have been familiar with when enacting the statute."0
However, the majority and the dissent disagreed as to the purpose of the statute, and the applicab!e precedent, when parents
were domiciled on the reservation, but intentionally traveled off
the reservation to give birth to, then abandon their child for adoption."1 The following narration will first discuss the purpose of the
ICWA as related to child custody proceedings and then review
those pre- and post-ICWA child custody cases that led to the
82
Court's ruling in Choctaw Indians v Holyfield.
Prior to 1968 the United States pursued a policy of assimilation
with regard to Indians."a Indians were considered a transient prob77. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1617.
78. Id.
79. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1611-12.
80. Id. at 1611-12. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 285 (1956).
Definitions of statutory terms are constructed in the light of the "object and policy" of the
statute. (quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849)). Id. See also
District of Columbia v Murphy, 314 U. S. 441 (1941). In Murphy, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia was determining the meaning of domicile within the District of
Columbia Income Tax Act. Id. That court stated "To ascertain its meaning we therefore
consider the Congressional history of the Act, the situation with reference to which it was
enacted, and the existing judicial precedents, with which Congress may be taken to have
been familiar in at least a general way." Id. at 449. See also United States v Dickerson, 310
U. S. 554, 562 (1940). The Court looked at the legislative history of a proviso appended to
an appropriation in § 402 of Public Resolution 122, June 21, 1938 when defining the proviso
which suspended the right to re-enlistment allowances. Id.
81. See generally, Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. 1597.
82. Id.
83. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 1123
(1979). See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 336, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1982 & Supp. IV, 1986)). The
General Allotment Act authorized the President to allot Indian Lands whenever "in his
opinion such reservation or any part of it may be advantageously utilized for agricultural or
grazing purposes." 25 U.S.C. § 331. This Act broke up the reservations and assimilated the
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lem that would eventually solve itself as Indians were absorbed
into the "melting pot of America.""4 The Indian Civil Rights Act of
196885 reversed this policy of assimilation."6 However, the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes continued. 7 This
practice continued to have the effect of assimilating the Indian
children into American society, and was seen to limit the future of
reservations as Indian cultural centers. 8 Studies conducted by the
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), in 1974 indicated
that approximately 25 to 35 percent of all Indian children were
separated from their families.89 Most of these children were placed
under some form of care where supervision was by a non-Indian.90
Indians into American culture. Id.; Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 ch. 505, 67
Stat. 588-90 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987))(providing for state
jurisdiction committed by or against Indians in the Indian country); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)
(an enunciated policy of assimilation providing the means for states to assume control of
reservation government). Section 108 of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §
1918 allows an Indian tribe that was subject to state jurisdiction through Public Law 280 to
petition the Secretary to reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. 25 U.S.C. §
1918 (1978). Note that the State of Mississippi had never asserted jurisdiction over the
Choctaw Reservation under Public Law 280. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1605 n.16.
84. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON FEDERAL STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 179 (Comm. Print. 1976).
85. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1341 (1982 & Supp. V, 1987).

86.

Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 1123

n.2, (1979). See also Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 33, 347 A.2d 228 (1975). The Court
of Appeals of Maryland determined that since that state had not enacted enabling legislation pursuant to section 1322(a) of The Indian Civil Rights Act, Maryland Courts had no
jurisdiction over matters involving custody of Indian children. Id. Section 1322(a) of The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 permits a state, which has the consent of the Indian tribe to
be affected, to exercise jurisdiction over civil causes of actions among Indians, or arising
within the Indian territory affected by the usurpation of state jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. §
1322(a)(1968).
87. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1124,
(1979)(citing AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE AND

TRIBAL JURISDICTION 179, 79-81 (Comm. Print. 1976).
88. Id.
89. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 9 of the House Report No. 95-1386). The AAIA is a
national non-profit organization that protects the tribes' right of self-government. The
AAIA was closely involved in helping to draft the Act. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., et al. at 3. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v
Holyfields, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
90. See Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(92 Stat. 3069) 7530,7531-32 (citing page 9-10 of the House Report No. 95-1386). For example, a survey conducted by the AAIA of 16 states in 1969 found that approximately 85 percent of all Indian children in foster care were living in non-Indian homes. Id. In Minnesota,
according to state figures in 1978, more than 90 percent of non-related adoptions for Indian
children were made by non-Indian couples, and informed estimates suggest that this rate is
the norm. Id.; See also 124 Cong. Rec. 38102.
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Adoptive placements constituted a significant portion of this total,
and the adoption rate for Indian children was much higher than
that of non-Indian children."
One of the tragedies of these adoptive placements was that often
the state agency that took the child from its parents and tribe was
either unable or unwilling to understand the different social norms
that prevailed in the Indian culture.9 2 Social workers who were ignorant of Indian family life frequently claimed that children were
neglected or abandoned because they often did not understand the
concept of the extended Indian family, ie. that an Indian child had
many relatives, perhaps more than a hundred, who are responsible
members of the family.93 If a child does have need for a parent the
extended family would take the child in.94 However, many social
workers had concluded that when Indian parents left their children
outside of the nuclear family, it was evidence of neglect and was
grounds for removal of the children. 5 Thus, the state agencies and
officials had failed to take into account the unique position of In91. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 9 of the House Report No. 95-1386). For example, in
Minnesota the adoption rate for Indian children was eight times that of non-Indian children, and for the year 1971 -1972 in the State of Minnesota almost one out of every four
children under the age of one was placed for adoption. Id.; See also 124 Cong. Rec. 38102,
(1978). In Arizona, 1 out of every 52 Indian children over the age of 21 was placed for
adoption. Id, For non-Indians the rate was 1 out of every 221. Id. These findings were incorporated into the Congressional findings of 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) which pointed out "that an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions." 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (4)(1978).
92. 124 Cong. Rec. 38102 (1978).
93. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92
Stat. 3069) 7530, 7532 (citing page 10 of the House Report No. 95-1386). Accord 25 U.S.C. §
1901(5) (1978). "[Tjhe States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." Id.
94. 1974 Hearings at 473. See also 1978 Hearings at 191-92. Mr. Calvin Isaac, supra
note 6, stated that "One of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian
children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by non-tribal government
authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises
underlying Indian home life and childrearing." 1978 Hearings at 191-92. Accord Wisconsin
Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (1973) (when
it was tribal tradition to act informally through blood relatives in assuming responsibility
for orphaned children the tribe did not waive its right to assert tribal jurisdiction when they
did not attempt through formal procedures to determined a guardian for the children.).
95. 1977 Hearings supra note 5, at 281. See also Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7532 (citing page 10 of the
House Report No. 95-1386).
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dian families and tribes in protecting the Indian family as the basis for their continued existence.""
Senate oversight hearings called this removal of Indian children
'97
from their homes "the most tragic aspect of Indian life today.
Not only was this situation harmful to the Indian children,"8 but
just as important, the removal of Indian children from their families or tribes threatened the very existence of the tribes.9 Representative Morris Udall, the ICWA's principal sponsor in the
House, stated that "Indian tribes and Indian people are being
drained of their children and, as a result, their future as a tribe
and a people is being placed in jeopardy." 100 When introducing the
bill to Congress on May 3, 1978, Mr. Udall stated:
There is nothing that is more central to the preservation of an Indian tribe
and no resource that is more vital to its future than its children. We could
not more effectively and completely destroy an Indian tribe than by depriving them of their children. .

.

. It is the purpose of this bill to protect the

legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in its own children and to insure that
Indian families are not routinely broken up.1 'O

In addition to the impact that state child welfare practices had
on family and tribal survival, there was concern that the tribes'
ability to continue as self-governing communities was seriously im1 02
paired by the removal of their Indian children.
Various Indian tribes had sought to manage their own destiny by
96. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7541 (citing page 19 of the House Report No. 95-1386)(conclusionary
statement).
97. 1974 Hearings at 3 (statement of William Byler).
98. See supra note 6.
99. See supra note 8 (comments of Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians).
100. 124 Cong. Rec. at 38102. See also remarks of the ICWA's minority sponsor, Rep.
Robert Lagomarsino, who stated that the bill was aimed, in part, to correct the conditions
that threatened the future of the American Indian tribes. Id.
101. Id. at 12532 - 12533. See also 25 U.S.C § 1901 (4) (1978).
102. 1978 Hearings at 193. Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association, testified
that "Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in
an area as socially and culturally determinative as family relationships." Id.; See also Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (WD
Mich. 1973). "For tribal sovereignty to have any meaning, it must necessarily include the
right, within its own boundaries and membership, to provide for the care and upbringing of
its young, a sine quo non to the preservation of its identity." Id. at 730. See also Wakefield
v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975). State interference with tribal control over
the custody of their children is a threat to "essential tribal relations.", Id. at, 347 A.2d at
237-38. Accord In re Adoption of Buel, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334, 1342 (1976).
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establishing the basic structures necessary for self-government.10 a
However, the continued removal of Indian children constituted a
serious threat to the existence of these tribes as ongoing, self-governing communities.10° As a result of, and in response to the continued removal of their children, many tribes sought to exercise
jurisdiction over Indian child custody procedures.1°5
Owing to the aforementioned reasons, the express Congressional
purpose of the ICWA was to "protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability of Indian tribes and fami'
lies." 106
The exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 1911 provided a means by which Indian tribes could retain control over
child custody proceedings in certain situations. 07
There were a number of judicial precedents before the enactment of the ICWA that involved state versus tribal jurisdiction
over Indian children. 08 In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee'0 9 was perhaps
the earliest case bearing on the matter of state jurisdiction over the
domestic relations of Indian tribal members." 0 In re Lelah-pucka-chee, a non-Indian guardian had been appointed by a state
court to care for an Indian child who was living on the reservation."' A writ of habeas corpus was brought on the child's behalf
because she was supposedly being forced against her wishes to attend an off-reservation school by her appointed guardian. 2 The
federal court held that the state court had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for an Indian child living on the reservation." s
103. See The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 Ch. 576, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982).
The Indian Reorganization Act Confirmed to Indian tribes the power of self government
through tribal constitutions and by-laws. Id. at § 476.
104. 124 Cong. Rec. at 38103 (statement of minority sponsor of the ICWA, Rep. Robert Lagomarsino).
105. See, eg., Fisher v District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976). See infra notes 111-112
and accompanying text; Wakefield v Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A. 2d 228 (1975), See
infra notes 115, & 118-127 and accompanying text; In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d
649, 652-653, 555 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1976), See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
106. 25 U.S.C. section 1902 (1978). See also Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 3069) 7530, 7531 (citing page 8 of the House
Report No. 95-1386)(Statement of Purpose).
107. 25 U.S.C. section 1911 (1978). See supra note 13.
108. See infra notes 109-141 and accompanying text.
109. 98 F. 429 (D.Iowa, N.D. 1899).
110. Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975)(comment from the
court).
111. In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee, 98 F. at 431.
112. Id. at 430.
113. Id. at 429. Note however that the court's decision was not to apply to individuals
who were not members of the tribe, or who had been "incorporated into the citizenship of
the state in which they reside . . .".Id. at 433.
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Before the ICWA, differing views on the jurisdictional division
between state and tribal courts in Indian child welfare matters resulted in different outcomes depending upon in which state the
proceeding took place. 14 For instance, some state courts would not
assert jurisdiction when the child was domiciled on the reservation,
while in other states the courts would assert jurisdiction when the
child was physically present within the state, but off the
reservation.'"
The United States Supreme Court decision in Fisher v. District
Court' 8 alleviated some of the confusion when it held that in cases
where the natural parents, adoptive parents, and child were all
members of the tribe, and all resided on the reservation, the tribal
court retained exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters.' 7
However, the typical Indian child adoption or custody cases did
not involve exclusively Indian parties who all resided on a reservation. In these typical situations, the state courts continued to disagree on the matter of jurisdiction, depending on whether a state
followed a theory of jurisdiction based on domicile or a theory of
jurisdiction based on presence within the state and off the reservation. 1 8 Two cases which reflected a domicile theory are Wisconsin
Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston"9
20
and Wakefield v. Little Light.'
When three orphaned children were enrolled members of the
Wisconsin Potowatomie tribe at the time of their parents' death,
114. See infra notes 110-136 and accompanying text.
115. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1123,
1128 (1979). See infra notes 118-141 and accompanying text.
116. 424 U.S. 382 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 926 (1976).
117. Id. (emphasis added). In Fisher, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court had found
that Alva Fisher, who was a member of the tribe residing on the reservation, had neglected
her child. Id. at 383. The Tribal Court made the child a ward of the court and awarded
temporary custody to Josephine Runsabove, another member of the tribe. Id. The Tribal
Court subsequently entered an order granting Alva temporary custody of her child, but four
days before the entry of that order, Josephine and her husband had initiated an adoption
proceeding in a Montana District Court. Id. The district court dismissed the adoption proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 384. The Montana Supreme Court held that the district court possessed jurisdiction. Id. at 385. The United States Supreme Court reversed
holding that "State-court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and exercised through the Tribal
Court." Id. at 387. Furthermore, it "would create a substantial risk of conflicting adjudications affecting the custody of the child and would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the Tribal Court." Id. at 388.
118. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARMz. L. REV. 1129 1130 (1979).
119. 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
120. 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
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the district court in Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community held that they were domiciled on the reservation
and considered Indians for jurisdictional purposes.12 1 As such, the
custody of the children should have been determined by the tribal
court and not by the laws and procedures of the state.'
In Wakefield, the Crow Indian tribal court issued letters of
guardianship for a limited duration appointing the Wakefields
(non-Indian husband and wife) special guardians of Allie Little
Light with the consent of Allie's mother Gail. 2 ' With the court's
permission, the Wakefields left the reservation with Allie and took
up residence in Maryland. 2 ' They then filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of Maryland to obtain temporary and permanent custody of Allie. 2 5 Gail petitioned the Crow
Court to terminate the guardianship. 26 Counsel for the Wakefields
12 7
was notified of Gail's petition but failed to enter an appearance.
The Crow Court subsequently terminated the Wakefields' guardianship, and ordered the Wakefields to surrender Allie to tribal officials. "28
' The chancellor for the circuit court then dismissed the
Wakefields' petition for temporary and permanent custody of the
child. "2' 9
The Wakefields appealed, contending that they were Maryland
residents and that Allie had resided with them in Maryland for
almost 20 months. 30 Therefore, Allie was domiciled in Maryland.' The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Allie's domicile remained with the Montana reservation where his mother
lived, and that the Crow Court was vested with exclusive jurisdic32
tion over his custody.
121.

Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community, 393 F. Supp. at

731.
122. Id. Cf. In re Greybull 23 Ore. App. 674, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975). The Circuit Court
of Multnomah County of Oregon had jurisdiction over children when they had not resided
or were domiciled on the reservation. Id at 677, 543 P.2d at 1080-81.
123. Wakefield, at 347 A.2d at 230.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 230-31.
127. Id. at 231.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 238. Cf In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). The
issue in In re Adoption of Buehl was the extent to which the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana retained jurisdiction over its children, free from interference by the courts of the State of Washington. Id. at 1336. Patricia Duckhead and her
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Other states seemed to follow a presence standard theory that
the mere presence of the Indian child off the reservation conferred
34
jurisdiction in the state courts.' 33 In In re Cantrell,1
the Supreme
Court of Montana held that notwithstanding the child's domicile
on the reservation, where the abandonment occurred off the reservation, the proceeding was removed from Indian jurisdiction.' 3 5 In
United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell,136 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Montana state court
had jurisdiction to determine custody of Indian children when the
parents had invoked the state court's jurisdiction for divorce
purposes. 1
In In re Duryea,'138 the natural parents and the Indian children
were all enrolled with the White Mountain Apache Tribe. 39 The
children were voluntarily and purposely removed from the reservation and placed with the petitioners. 140 The Supreme Court of Arison Daniel were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe and domiciled within the reservation in Montana. Id. Daniel was taken into the temporary protective custody of the Blackfeet Tribal Court and placed in temporary foster care for one year in the care of Robert and
Theda Anderson who resided in Seattle, Washington. Id. Robert was also an enrolled member of the Tribe. Id. Before the year was up, the Tribal Court found that Patricia Duckhead
had made a remarkable recovery and ordered the return of Daniel. Id. The Andersons refused. Id. The Supreme Court of Washington held that since Daniel was domiciled on the
reservation when he was made a ward of the tribal court, and since that court did not intend
a change in his domiciled when he was in temporary custody, he would continue to be domiciled on the reservation. Id. at 1340-41. Stating that the same reasons used in the decision in
Fisher (see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text) were applicable, the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the tribal courts order which directed that Daniel be returned to
his mother was entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 1341-42.
133. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 112931 (1979).
134. 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d. 179 (1972).
135. Id. at 495 P.2d at 182. In In re Cantrell, the Tribal Court had taken the child
from the mother's custody due to parental neglect, but later had returned the child to the
mother. Id. at 181. After these events, the mother had placed the child in the care of a
babysitter. Id. Prior to the mother's return, the putative father took the child with him on a
trip. Id. While off the reservation, the Valley County Welfare Department took the infant
"from its helpless position with its intoxicated father." Id.
136. 503 F.2d 790 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
137. Id. at 795. Both parents were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe. Id. at 791.
Temporary custody of the children was granted to the father by the state court from the
divorce decree, but the tribal judge issued, ex parte, a temporary restraining order enjoining
the children's removal from the Blackfeet Reservation. Id. at 792. Tribal law explicitly disclaimed tribal court jurisdiction over marriages. Id. at 795. The court interpreted this relinquishment of jurisdiction to encompass the surrender of jurisdiction over custody determinations incident to divorce. Id.
138. 115 Ariz. 86, 563 P.2d 885 (1977).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 563 P.2d at 886.
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zona determined that the children were not domiciled on the reservation, that the conduct of the parents in leaving the children took
place completely off the reservation, and therefore the Arizona
court had subject matter jurisdiction with respect to petitions to
terminate the parent-child relationship as a prelude to adoption of
the children.

141

With the enactment of the ICWA, Indian tribes have exclusive
jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding that involves an Indian child who is domiciled on the reservation. 4 Even if a child is
not domiciled on the reservation, the tribal court may exercise concurrent jurisdiction.""3 Now state courts had to look to the domicile
of the child to determine if tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction
in child custody proceedings. For example, in Arizona, a state that
had previously observed the presence standard,44 the Court of Appeals in In re appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action 45 held that
an illegitimate child took the same domicile of its unemancipated
Indian mother. 146 This gave the tribe exclusive jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings in spite of the fact that the child was
living off the reservation with the prospective adoptive parents.'
In In Re Adoption of Baby Child,"" the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico held that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the
adoption proceedings of an illegitimate Indian child.'4 9 New Mexico law declared that the domicile of an illegitimate child is the
domicile of its mother at the time of its birth.' 50 Since the mother
141. Id. at 887. Note however, Justice Gordon's concurring opinion in which he states
that he could not concur in the majority's reasoning because their opinion seemed to say
that there was no jurisdiction concurrent in the Tribal Court. Id. at 887. Cf. In re Adoption
of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976). The state court had jurisdiction of an Indian child
placed voluntarily with an adoption agency off the reservation. Id.
142. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911(a) (1978).
143. Id. at § 1911(b). See supra note 14.
144. See In re Duryea, supra notes 138-141. See supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text for an explanation of the presence standard.
145. No. S-903, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P. 2d 187 (App. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Social Services of Tucson v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
146. Id. at 635 P. 2d at 191.
147. Id. Note that the minor mother in this case originally executed a voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, but later requested that her child be returned, and that in
the interim the child had been placed with an adoptive family who were unwilling to give up
the child. Id. at 189.
148. 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
149. Id. at 700 P.2d 201.
150. Id. at 200-01. See, eg., In re Estate of Moore, 68 Wash. 2d. 792, 796, 415 P. 2d
653, 656 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 (2) § 22, Comment (c),
(1971); 25 AM. JUR. 2d, Domicil § 69 (1966).
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was determined to be a domiciliary of the Pueblo reservation, the
court held that jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings was exclusive in the tribal court under the ICWA, despite the fact that
the unwed mother gave her consent to the adoption.'
In the recent case of In re Adoption of Halloway, 52 the Supreme Court of Utah held that Utah's abandonment law was preempted by the ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction provision. 153 On May
14, 1977, Jeremiah Holloway was born to Cecelia Saunders, a full
blooded Navajo enrolled in the Navajo tribe and a domiciliary of
the Navajo reservation.' 54 Jeremiah was cared for on the reservation by his maternal grandmother. 55 Subsequently, in 1980, Cecelia gave her oral consent to Jeremiah's maternal aunt to have Jeremiah removed from the reservation and to be placed in adoptive
care. Two months later she executed a consent to adoption before
the Fourth District Court for Utah County, Utah.15 1 In May 1982,
the Navajo Nation intervened in the adoption proceeding by asserting exclusive jurisdiction under Section 1911 of the ICWA. 5 7
Finding that the mother had intentionally abandoned the child,1 58
the court granted the adoption and the Navajo Nation appealed. 159
The Supreme Court of Utah determined that, under Utah law,
when Cecelia "abandoned" Jeremiah, he would have acquired the
domicile of his adopted parents.6 0 However, this law impermissibly conflicted with the ICWA, and in their opinion the court stated
that:
To the extent that Utah abandonment law operates to permit Jeremiah's

151.

Id.

152. 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
153. Id. at 969-70.
154. Id. at 963.
155.

Id.

156. Id. Jeremiah's aunt testified that she concealed from the Navajo Division of Social Welfare her intention to remove Jeremiah from the reservation from the because she

did not want him placed in an Indian home that would have the same drinking problems
prevalent in Jeremiah's family. Id. at 968.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 967. "As a general matter, abandonment occurs when a parent deserts a
child or places a child with another with an intent to relinquish all parental rights and
obligations." Id. at 966. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §22 comment
(e) (1971).
159. 732 P.2d at 965.
160. Id. at 967. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §22 comment (i)
(1971). (if both the parents abandon the child, he acquires the domicile of the person who
stands in loco parentis to him); Id. at comment e. See also 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domicil § 69
(1966)(if a child is abandoned by one parent, he takes on the domicile of his remaining
parent).

1990

Recent Decision

mother to change his domicile as part of a scheme to facilitate his adoption
by non-Indians while she remains a domiciliary of the reservation, it conflicts with and undermines the operative scheme established by subsections
101(a) and 103(a) to deal with children of domiciliaries of the reservation
and weakens considerably the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its children. The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which
recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from
but on a parity with the interest of the parents. 6 '

Thus, the Supreme Court of Utah agreed and found that Cecelia
had intended to abandon her child even before she signed the consent to adoption when she allowed the child's aunt to remove him
from the reservation and to remain with foster parents, but that
Utah abandonment law was preempted by the federal considera62
tions of the ICWA.1
A number of state courts had determined that the ICWA did not
apply where an unwed mother voluntarily relinquished her child
for adoption shortly after birth. 63 However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage'" held
that the fact that the mother had voluntarily given up her child for
adoption did not circumvent the application of the ICWA, even
though the child had never lived in an Indian environment nor
5
with an Indian family.1
It was against this backdrop of cases and the legislative history
of the ICWA that the Supreme Court decided in Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v Holyfields'6 6 that a federal definition of
domicile within the meaning of the ICWA would pre-empt Mississippi's abandonment law and give the Choctaw Indian Tribal
Court exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings concerning
the twins.' 6 7
Under the ICWA's child custody provisions, 6 8 the Indian parent's interests in the child will sometimes conflict with the inter161. 732 P.2d at 969.
162. See generally 732 P. 2d 962.
163. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982); In re
S.A.M., 703 S.W. 2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059
(Okl. 1085), cert. denied sub nom. Harjo v. Duello, 108 S. Ct. 1042 (1988). Note that these
cases all involved an illegitimate child born to a non-Indian mother and that the child had
never been in the care or custody of its father or part of any Indian family relationship. Id.
164. 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988).
165. Id. In In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, the mother was a registered
member of the Rosebud Sioux Indian Tribe. Id. at 543 A.2d 930. See also In re Appeal in
Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228 (Ct. App.1983).
166. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
167. Id.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978), See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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ests of the Tribe in voluntary adoption proceedings.16 9 The issue in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield1 70 was to define
the word "domicile" under § 1911(a)17 1 of the ICWA to determine
if the Choctaw Indian Tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction
when J.B. and W.J., who were domiciled on the reservation, purposely travelled off the reservation to give birth to B.B. and G.B.,
and then voluntarily abandoned their children to state court juris72
diction to be adopted by the Holyfields.1
The Court held that the twins retained the domicile of their parents, thereby giving the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over the
adoption proceedings under the ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction
provision.' 7 3
One might question the result if only one of the parents is domiciled on the reservation and the other parent who lives off the reservation seeks to impose state court jurisdiction in child custody
proceedings174 with the acquiescence of the parent who is domiciled on the reservation. Would it make any difference if it was the
father, or the mother, who was domiciled on the reservation?
Would it matter if the child was living with the parent who was
domiciled off the reservation? What if the child was illegitimate?' 7 5
What outcome if the parent domiciled on the reservation abandons
17
the child to the parent who lives off the reservation?
The general rule is that the child's domicile is the same as the
parents domicile with whom the child lives.' 7 7 Thus, if the child
lived with a parent off the reservation the child would be domiciled
off the reservation giving the tribe concurrent, rather than exclu169. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Navajo Nation at 12, Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1988).[hereinafter Brief for the Navajo Nation]. The
Navajo Nation filed their amicus brief because the Supreme Court's decision in Choctaw
Indians would have great impact on the inherent power of the Indian tribes over their internal domestic affairs. Id. at 1.
170. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
"171. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
172. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1605.
173. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1611.
174. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1) (defining "child custody proceedings" to include "foster
care placement", "termination of parental rights", "preadoptive placement" and "adoptive
placement, but not to include "an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the
parents.").
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 comment, (c) (1971) (An
illegitimate child generally has the domicile of its mother with certain exceptions).
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, comment (e) (1971) (A
child who is abandoned by one parent takes on the domicile of the parent who has not
abandoned the child).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22(1) (1971).
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sive, jurisdiction. 17 However, in Choctaw Indians1 79 a definition of

domicile which would have given the state courts concurrent jurisdiction' was rejected when it would defeat the purpose of the
ICWA in protecting the interest of Indian children and promoting
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.' 8 '
The meaning of domicile for purposes of the ICWA depends on
the "object and policy" of the statute.' The purpose of the ICWA
is to "protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."'8 " The Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines for state courts in Indian child
custody proceedings does state that there is no indication that
state definitions of domicile would undermine the purposes of the
ICWA.184 However, these guidelines are not binding on state
courts.8 5 Moreover, if a state law of domicile undermines the purposes of the ICWA, the state law should not be applied.'
The dissent in Choctaw Indians maintained that the most important provisions of the ICWA are to provide procedural safeguards to insure that parental rights are protected. 87 During the
hearings on the Act there was some concern expressed over the encroachment of parental rights. 8 For example, Mr. Calvin Isaac,
Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians stated
178. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
179. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
180. See supra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978)
(ICWA Congressional declaration of policy).
182. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
183. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
184. Bureau of Indian Affairs; Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 6784, 6785 (1979).
185. Id. at 6784.
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
187. Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. 1612. In supporting its opinion the dissent referred
to 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(d)-(f)(in foster care placement, or involuntary termination of parental
rights, it must be established that efforts have been made to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family, and that if the child remained with the parent serious emotional or physical
damage to the child would be the likely result); §§ 1912(b)(c)(parents have the right to
examine all reports and documents filed with the court, and indigent parents have the right
to appointment of counsel); § 1913(in cases of voluntary termination the parents' consent is
only valid if the terms and consequences of the consent are fully explained, may be withdrawn at any time up to the final decree of adoption, and even then may subsequently be
attacked); and 1911(b)(gives parents a veto to prevent the transfer of a state court action to
a tribal court in voluntary proceedings). Id. 1612 -13.
188. See generally 1978 Hearings. See also 1977 Hearings at 158. Mr. Calvin Isaac,
Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, speaking on behalf of the National
Tribal Chairmen's Association stated "[1it seems there is a great potential in the provisions
of section 101(c) for infringing parental wishes and rights." Id.
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that "[T]he ultimate responsibility for child welfare rests with the
parents and we would not support legislation which interfered with
that basic relationship."' 8 9
However, the ICWA was enacted not only to protect the interests of Indian children and their parents, but also to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes.190 Consider, for example,
that the legislative history of the Act expressed concern over the
survival of the Indian tribes as ongoing, self-governing communities unless some type of legislation was enacted to protect the
tribe's interest in their children.' 9" To accomplish this purpose, the
ICWA has numerous provisions that protect the interests of the
tribe in the welfare of their Indian children.'9 2 In fact, the tribe's
interest in their children under the ICWA is distinct from, but
stands on equal footing with, the interests of the parents. 9 ' Central to tribal sovereignty is the right of tribes to control the custody of their children. 94 To protect the tribes interest, the ICWA
gives the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction in child custody and
adoption matters for reservation-domiciled Indian children.9 5 The
ICWA also designates the tribal court as the preferred forum for
nondomiciliary Indian children.19 6 State laws of domicile can not
be used if it would frustrate the tribe's ability to assert its interest
in its children. 97 In addition, the Act should be liberally construed
189. 1978 Hearings at 62.
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978)(emphasis added).
191. See supra notes 9, 11, 52, 99-102 and accompanying text.
192. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)(See supra note 13 and accompanying text), § 1911(b)
(See supra note 12 and accompanying text), § 1911(c)(tribal right to intervene in state court
custody proceedings), § 1912(a)(tribe's right to notice of involuntary proceedings involving
placement of, or termination of, parental rights to an Indian child), § 1914 (tribe's right to
petition for invalidation of state court action), § 1915(a)(in adoptive placements under state
law preference is to be given to 1. members of the child's extended family; 2. other members
of the Indian child's tribe; or 3. other Indian families.); § 1915(c) (tribes right to alter the
presumptive placement priorities of § 1915(a)); § 1915(e)(tribes right to obtain records of
state court actions); § 1919 (Indian tribe authorization to enter into agreements with the
state regarding the care and custody of Indian children).
193. See In re Adoption of Halloway, supra note 161 and accompanying text.
194. Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228, 237-38 (1975). See supra
notes 118-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wakefield. See also Wisconsin
Potowatomies stating: "If tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all ... it must necessarily include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to provide for the care
and upbringing of its young, a sine quo non to the preservation of its identity." Wisconsin
Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730 (W.D.
Mich. 1973). See supra notes 119, 121, and 122.
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a)(1978). See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
196. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)(1978). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
197. Id. See supra note 160-61 and accompanying text.
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to favor results which would defer to tribal judgment in Indian
child custody matters and keep Indian children within their culture. 198 To this end, the liberal definition of "domicile" as laid
down by the Supreme Court is necessary to give the ICWA the full
scope that Congress intended it to have.
Even before the enactment of the ICWA the United States Supreme Court had held that when all parties involved in the adoption proceeding are members of, and reside on, the reservation, the
tribal court retained exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.199 After the passage of the ICWA, in those state cases where
an Indian parent was domiciled on a reservation, but had executed
a consent to adoption decree while outside the reservation, the
state courts have confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal
court.200
The dissent in Choctaw Indians placed great emphasis on the
rights of Indian parents, over the rights of the Indian tribe, when
parents who were domiciled on the reservation voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to their child who was born off the
reservation. 0 1 The dissent, pointing to both the language and legislative history of the Act, believed that the Act was passed in response to the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their
family and tribes.20 2 However, the House Report makes it clear
that this language was meant to include Indian children that are
abandoned by their parents to welfare departments.20 3 The fact
198. 44 Fed. Reg. at 6785.
199. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), reh'g denied 425 U.S. 926 (1976).
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
200. See In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; In Re Adoption of Baby Child supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text;
In re Adoption of Halloway supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
201. See generally, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. at 1611-17
(1988).
202. Id. at 1612. "...
an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up
by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and
private agencies..". 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (4) (1978); "Indian families face vastly greater risks of
involuntary separation than are typical of our society as a whole." House Report, at 9
(1978); "The record . . . has disclosed what almost amounts to a callous raid on Indian
children." 124 Cong. Rec. 12532 (1978)(remarks of Rep. Udall); See also 124 Cong. Rec.
38103 (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino concerning the "continued wholesale removal" of Indian children).
203. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(92 State. 3069) 7530, 7534 (citing page 12 of the House Report No. 95-1386). "One of the
effects of our national paternalism has been to so alienate some Indian [parents] from their
society that they abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare departments rather than
entrust them to the care of relatives int eh extended family. Another expression of it is the
involuntary, arbitrary, and unwarranted separation of families." Id. See also In the Matter
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that the children were voluntarily abandoned cannot be used to
defeat the tribes interest in their children.2 4 Furthermore, if the
Indian child resides or is domiciled on the reservation, the tribe
has exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings even if
the child is voluntarily abandoned by its parents."'
The ICWA was also enacted to protect the best interests of the
Indian children. 0 The findings of the Senate Report state that the
"[r]emoval of Indian children from their cultural setting . . . has

damaging social and psychological impact on many individual In' 20 7
dian children.

Case law, the legislative history of the ICWA, and the Act itself
establish that ". . . it is in the Indian child's best interest that its
relationship to the tribe be protected. ' 208 Thus, whenever possible,

the Indian child should be kept within an Indian environment,
preferably with their extended families within the tribal
29
community.
10
A fair reading of the Courts decision in Choctaw IndiansM
would seem to indicate that in construing the term domicile the
courts should enhance, rather than limit, tribal sovereignty and
self determination. On the other hand, it can be argued that in a
case where the child lives with the parent who is domiciled off the
reservation and who seeks to impose state court jurisdiction in
of an Adoption of an Indian Child, 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988). Many Indian parents
relinquish parental rights because of pressure, or a perceived sense of insurmountable barriers and inadequacy as a parent. Tribal control over the Indian child in these situations
protects against the intimidation of Indian parents to prevent thoughtless actions by the
parent that would be contrary to the child's best interests. Id.
204. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. at 1608 (1989). See
supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
205. 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) (1978).
206. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207. Senate Report at 52. See also Senate Report, at 43. Louis La Rose, chairman of
the Winnegago Tribe stated before the American Indian Policy Review Commission, "I
think the cruelest trick that the white man has ever done to Indian children is to take them
into adoption courts, erase all of their records and send them off to some nebulous family
. . . and [when] that child reaches 16 or 17, he is a little brown child residing in a white
community and he goes back to the reservation and he has absolutely no idea who his relatives are, and they effectively make him a non-person and I think . . . they destroy him."
Id.
208. In The Matter of The Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 130
Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d at 189 (App. 1981), cert. denied sub. nom. Catholic Social Services of
Tucson v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). See also supra notes 1-4, 89-93 and accompanying
text.
209. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., et al. at
31. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
210. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
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child custody proceeding, the degree of state infringement on tribal
sovereignty is even less than it was in Choctaw Indians.
Should future questions concerning a child's domicile arise, any
parental interest must be weighed against the best interest of the
child, its extended family, and the tribe. The tribe's interest in
their children under the ICWA is distinct from, but stands on
equal footing with, the interests of the parents.2 11 Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield directs that courts must insure that these interests cannot be outweighed by the interest of a
parent who simply seeks to avoid the tribal courts jurisdiction.
It should be briefly mentioned that the term "domicile" is not
the only critical term in the ICWA that is undefined. For example,
tribal courts retain not only concurrent, but presumptive jurisdiction if the child is not domiciled or residing on the reservation.2 1 2
This presumptive jurisdiction is subject to objection by either parent or "good cause to the contrary."2 13 What constitutes "good
cause to the contrary" is not explained in the ICWA.
One can easily imagine how differing standards for "good cause"
would impair the consistent nationwide application of the ICWA.
For example, if an Indian reservation fell within two or more
states, Indian parents domiciled on the reservation who were seeking to avoid a tribal courts jurisdiction would seek to bring custody
actions in the state courts with the most favorable "good cause"
standards. This problem of differing state definitions of key terms
in the ICWA is precisely the same problem that the Supreme
Court was confronted with in Choctaw Indians when several states
were applying different definitions of domicile. 1 The reasons
stated in Choctaw Indians for applying a federal definition of
domicile for purposes of the ICWA are equally compelling for
adopting a federal definition of good cause.2" 5 Applying this same
approach to interpret "good cause", courts must begin to develop
federal standards that will protect the rights of the tribe in retaining its children. These standards should be aimed at establishing
"a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should re211. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1610 (1989)
(quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 969-70 (Utah 1986)). See supra note 161
and accompanying text.
212. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 163-65.
215. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (stating the courts reasoning in
Choctaw Indians for applying a federal definition of domicile).
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It should be noted that if the Mississippi definition of domicile
was applied in cases of abandonment, the Choctaw Tribe would
not have any jurisdictional rights in adoption proceedings since all
Mississippi Choctaw children are born in hospitals outside of the
reservation. 1 7 Further, individual adult Indians that are domiciled
on an Indian reservation should not be able to enjoy the rights and
benefits of tribal membership on the one hand, but then be able to
deny those rights and benefits to their children. '
In passing the ICWA into law, Congress recognized the need to
provide Indian Tribes with the ability to control their own destiny
by giving the Indian Tribes either exclusive, or concurrent, jurisdiction over cases of child custody."1 9 An essential requirement for
tribal survival is the ability to retain it's children. Only by passing
along customs, traditions, and values to it's children can any particular nation, or people, retain it's identity. It is important to realize that in the Indian culture it is not only the parents that have
this responsibility, but it is the tribe as a community who is ultimately responsible for the well-being of it's children.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 2' illustrates
the conflict that can occur between Tribal rights and parental
rights when applying the ICWA. In the past the Supreme Court
has said that the family is not beyond the power of regulation in
the public interest, and to that extent governmental power is broad
when a child's welfare is affected.' When the majority of the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield2 2 2 gave the word "domicile" a federal definition, it can be
said that they applied this same principle through the ICWA's provisions. It is now the law that when an Indian parent is domiciled
on the reservation, the ICWA gives the Tribe exclusive jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings, regardless- of where the child is
born. Thus, the decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
216. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 (1989)
(quoting House Report No. 95-1386 at page 23).
217. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Navajo Nation, at 11. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
218. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., et al. at
48-49. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
219. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
220. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
221. Prince v. Massachusetts,321 U.S. 158, 167 (1943); reh. den. 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
222. 109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989).
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v. Holyfield 22 3 serves as a warning to Indian parents that if they
are domiciled on the reservation they can not circumvent the
Tribe's interest in retaining it's children.
Jeffrey Murray

223.

Id.

